The State Administration Council (SAC) junta in Myanmar is in its worst position since the beginning of the civil war in February 2021. Operation 1027, a joint assault in October 2023 by three ethnic armed organisations in northern Shan state, has catalysed rebel victories across the country. The ethnic armed organisations and other rebel People’s Defence Forces have been making significant territorial gains, targeting border areas, junta bases and industry centres.
The SAC has resorted to mandating military service for all men and women, including forcibly recruiting Rohingya into service under threat of arrest. Following the new conscription law, reports have emerged of abductions and illegal detention, with large numbers of young people fleeing to Thailand to escape conscription.
The SAC has faced significant territorial losses, impacting its ability to extract vital resources. While the conflict is unlikely to stop soon, rebel forces now stand a better chance of victory than they have at any other point in the conflict.
The possibility of a SAC loss of power and the inevitable transition period as a new government is formed presents an element of unpredictability that many observer states seek to avoid — none more than China. Beijing’s Myanmar strategy is one characterised by pragmatism. China maintains relations with both the SAC and a number of ethnic armed organisations and has provided political and material support to parties involved in both sides of the conflict.
With the relaunching of operations along the Chinese border, Beijing has grown increasingly frustrated with SAC leadership and northern ethnic armed organisations for spreading conflict which threatens Chinese interests. Along with its concern for Chinese populations along the border, China also has significant economic interests in Myanmar, including a natural gas pipeline, rare earth mineral mines and a port to be established in southwest Myanmar.
While some of these economic projects began under the deposed National League for Democracy government led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the SAC has continued to work closely with China and Beijing has no guarantee that any ethnic armed organisation would be willing to carry out the same level of economic cooperation. With no centralised opposition force representing all rebel factions in Myanmar, the SAC remains China’s best alliance option.
It is no wonder that China has pushed so hard in talks with combatants and in high-level meetings with regional leaders for an end to the conflict in Myanmar. China has attempted to negotiate ceasefires multiple times, all of which have been broken. Any China-led negotiations benefit the SAC by stopping rebel momentum and allowing the SAC’s armed forces — the Tatmadaw — to regroup and direct their attention elsewhere.
Elections have emerged as a key component of Chinese support for the SAC, following a broader pattern within Chinese foreign policy. In August, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi promised to provide technological assistance and monetary aid for the SAC’s upcoming elections. China also made its desire for a ‘democratic transition’ in Myanmar clear in meetings with ASEAN political leaders.
The SAC has ensured that they will win any elections that take place, having dissolved 40 opposition parties — including the National League for Democracy, which won almost 90 per cent of the popular vote in Myanmar’s last election in 2020. Other political parties have been prevented from registering for the election. This almost certain victory would allow the SAC to portray itself as the democratically elected government of Myanmar and the rebels as threats to democracy, changing the narrative of the civil war.
China and the SAC’s other allies will certainly latch onto this new narrative. Promoting democracy and peace efforts has increasingly been a part of Beijing’s foreign affairs strategy, as China has been seeking to portray itself as a peaceful nation and a key player on the world stage. It would serve China’s best interest if Beijing were able to successfully lead Myanmar towards peace, even if the government it props up is inherently authoritarian.
The SAC plans to carry out elections in 2025 with support from the Chinese government. The United States, Japan, South Korea and other democracies must expose these elections for what they are: unfree and unfair. SAC-backed elections will not reflect public support in Myanmar and they certainly will not bring about an end to fighting. Instead, states should work with opposition groups to ensure a truly peaceful transition once the SAC is defeated.
While Washington has already taken steps towards dialogue with the shadow National Unity Government, additional messaging campaigns need to occur if elections are held in 2025, to delegitimise the SAC and communicate that their attempts to hold on to power do not reflect the desires of the people of Myanmar. The SAC, China and their allies will try to take control of the narrative surrounding these elections. The United States and its allies must take control of it first.